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NORTH DAKOTA LEGAL MALPRACTICE:
A SUMMARY OF THE LAW
ALVIN 0. BOUCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The frequency of legal malpractice' claims has been increasing rap-
idly in the United States over the last decade. 2 North Dakota has seen a
similar rise in such claims. 3 As the frequency of legal malpractice claims
increases in North Dakota, more of North Dakota's attorneys will be
approached by clients seeking legal representation. Although an article,4
a note,5 a case comment,' and two bibliographies7 have been published in
the North Dakota Law Review on the subject of legal malpractice, until
* Attorney with Robert Vogel Law Office, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota, practicing in the
area of plaintiff professional liability law; J.D., 1984, University of New Mexico School of Law; M.A.
in Art, 1977, Mankato State University (Ceramics); B.A., 1974, summa cum laude and Phi Beta
Kappa, University of North Dakota (Political Science and Russian Studies).
The author wishes to thank his secretary, Dardi Olson, for her assistance and loyalty, and his
wife, Thomasine Heitkamp, for her encouragement and for watching their two pre-school children in
the evening while this article was written.
1. The first reported North Dakota case to use the words -legal malpractice" was Feil v. Wishek,
193 N.W.2d 218 (1971). The term "legal malpractice," however, was not defined until Johnson v.
Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (1981), when the court stated:
Malpractice . . .is the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that
degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the
community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result
that injury, loss or damage to ... those entitled to rely upon em.
LId. at 538 (quoting WesER's THIRD NEv INTERNATIoNAL DIcTiONARY (unabridged ed. 1971)).
The term mapractice "refers to the nature of the subject matter of the action and not to the form of
remedial procedure, whether it be in tort or contract." lId. Thus, legal malpractice is simply negli-
gence by an attorney in his or her professional duty toward a client.
Legal malpractice is just one type of lawsuit that can be brought against an attorney by a client.
Along with the legal malpractice case, or in lieu thereof, the attorney may be sued for breach of
contract, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of warranties or implied promises, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, false arrest or imprisonment, interference with an advantageous relationship, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, defamation, and conversion. While these
actions can be brought against an attorney, they are not unique to the legal profession; therefore, they
are not considered to be legal malpractice. I RoNALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LECAL
MALPRAC1TCE, § 1.1, at 3 (3d ed. 1989).
2. Ik § 1.6, at 17-19. When the first edition of the Mallen & Smith treatise about legal
malpractice was published in the 1970's, Mr. Mallen had read about 600 malpractice cases
nationwide; now he reads 700 cases a year. Thom Weidlich, Suing Lawyers Brings Growth to
Shadow Bar, 16 NAT'L. L.J. June 13, 1994, at 1.
3. See infra note 10 (citing North Dakota legal malpractice cases).
4. See Franklin D. Houser, Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55 N.D. L REV. 185 (1979). This
article provides an overview of the law of legal malpractice and a bibliography. However, there is not
a single citation to a North Dakota case in its 39 pages.
5. See Dwain E. Fagerlund, Note, Legal Malpractice: The Locality Rule and Other Limitations
of the Standard of Care: Should Rural and Metropolitan Lawyers Be Held to the Same Standard of
Care?, 64 N.D. L. REv. 661 (1988).
6. See Jeffrey P. Rude, Comment, Limitations of Actions-North Dakota Adopts Continuous
Representation Rule for Tolling Statute of Limitations In Legal Malpractice Actions, 64 N.D. L. Rv.
719 (1988).
7. Bibliography, Selected Journal Articles Concerning Legal Malpractice, 64 N.D. L. REV. 719
(1988); see also supra note 4 (referring to the bibliography in the Houser article).
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now no article has discussed the range of North Dakota's case law on the
subject of attorney malpractice.8 This article summarizes the current sta-
tus of legal malpractice law in North Dakota. It is not intended to be an
exhaustive analysis of the law of legal malpractice, but instead is intended
to be a basic primer of North Dakota legal malpractice law for attorneys.
Each section of this article discusses a different aspect of legal mal-
practice in North Dakota. Part II provides a brief history of the develop-
ment of legal malpractice case law in North Dakota. Part III of this
article discusses the four essential elements of a legal malpractice case.
Part IV explains some of the common defenses raised in legal malpractice
cases. Because there are a limited number of attorneys in North Dakota
willing to sue another North Dakota attorney, the ultimate goal of this
article is to encourage more attorneys to represent clients in legal mal-
practice cases.9
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE
LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
There are thirty-one reported legal malpractice cases decided by the
North Dakota Supreme Court and the federal courts of North Dakota.10
Since 1980, North Dakota has seen a relative explosion of reported cases
involving legal malpractice. Over two-thirds (twenty) of the reported
8. There was also an article written on legal malpractice insurance policies. See Robert W.
Minto & Marcia D. Morton, The Anatomy of Legal Malpractice Insurance: A Comparative View, 64
N.D. L. REv. 547 (1988). Legal malpractice cases are also very generally discussed in the Law
Review's North Dakota Supreme Court Review. See, e.g., North Dakota Supreme Court Review, 66
N.D. L REv. 834-36 (1990) (discussing Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654 (1989)); North
Dakota Supreme Court Review, 68 N.D. L. REv. 758-60 (1992) (discussing Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466
N.W.2d 553 (1992)).
9. This has been observed from the author's personal experience in attempting to refer clients
for representation and in talking with other plaintiff legal malpractice attorneys. See also 1 MALLEN
& SMrriH, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1-2.
10. Of the 31 decisions, the following 29 cases are North Dakota Supreme Court decisions: Bye
v. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1994); Richmond v. Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 759 (1993); Finch v.
Backes, 491 N.W.2d 705 (1992); Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d 553 (1991); Thompson v. Goetz, 455
N.W.2d 580 (1990); Klein v. Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d 738 (1990); Berglund v. Gilsvig, 448 N.W.2d
627 (1989); Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654 (1989); Wastvedt v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561
(1988); Herzog v. YuiU, 399 N.W.2d 287 (1987); Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (1988); Wall v.
Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (1986) [hereinafter Wall II]; Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81 (1985);
Shark v. Thompson, 373 N.W.2d 859 (1985); Bohn v. Johnson. 371 N.W.2d 781 (1985); Wall v. Lewis,
366 N.W.2d 471 (1985) [hereinafter Wall I]; Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum. 359 N.W.2d 865 (1985);
Phillips Fur and Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448 (1983); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler,
Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175 (1981); Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (1981); Rolfstad, Winkjer, Suess,
McKennett & Kaiser v. Hanson, 221 N.W.2d 734 (1974); Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218 (1971);
White Earth Creamery v. Edwardson, 191 N.W. 622 (1922); Stark County v. Mischel, 173 N.W. 817
(1919); Moran v. Simpson, 173 N.W. 769 (1919); Harmening v. Howland, 141 N.W. 131 (1913);
Riegi v. Phelps, 60 N.W. 402 (1894); Logan v. Freerks, 103 N.W. 426 (1905); Yerkes v. Crum, 49
N.W. 422 (1891).
The remaining two decisions are North Dakota federal court decisions: Knoshaug v. Pollman,
245 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1957); Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
943 (1980).
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cases have been decided since 1980.11 Of all reported cases, over one-
half (seventeen) have been decided in the last ten years.1 2 Only two cases
were decided between 1925 and 1979.11 Between 1889 and 1925, there
were only seven cases. 1
4
All of the first seven reported cases in North Dakota involved acts of
dishonesty or acquisition of an adverse financial interest by the attor-
neys.15 After these cases, which were decided during the late 1800's and
early 1900's, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not issue another legal
malpractice decision until almost fifty years later in Fel v. Wishek.
16
While a large number of the modem cases discuss issues of deceit
and acquisition of adverse interests, the reported cases since Wishek pres-
ent a broader range of malpractice allegations. The allegations include:
representation of adverse interests;1 7 failure to initiate a lawsuit within the
statute of limitations;18 negligence in business contracts and dealings;' 9
negligence in criminal defense matters;20 fraud and deceit;2' negligence
11. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1994); Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 759 (1993); Finch, 491 N.W.2d
705 (1992); /insey, 466 N.W.2d 553 (1991); Goetz, 455 N.W.2d 580 (1990); Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d
738 (1990); Berglund, 448 N.W.2d 627 (1989); Swanson, 445 N.W.2d 654 (1989); Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d
561 (1988); Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (1988); Herzog, 399 N.W.2d 287 (1987); Wall II, 393 N.W.2d
758 (1986); Binstock, 374 N.W.2d 81 (1985); Shark, 373 N.W.2d 859 (1985); Bohn, 371 N.W.2d 781
(1985); Wall 1, 366 N.W.2d 471 (1985); Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d 865 (1985); Bailey, 340 N.W.2d
448 (1983); Letnes, 311 N.W.2d 175 (1981); Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533 (1981).
12. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1994); Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 759 (1993); Finch, 491 N.W.2d
705 (1992); Kins y, 466 N.W.2d 553 (1991); Goetz, 455 N.W.2d 580 (1990); Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d
738 (1990); Berglund, 448 N.W.2d 627 (1989); Swanson, 445 N.W.2d 654 (1989); Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d
561 (1988); Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (1988); Herzog, 399 N.W.2d 287 (1987); Wall //, 393 N.W.2d
758 (1986); Binstock, 374 NAV.2d 81 (1985); Shark, 373 N.W.2d 859 (1985); Bohn, 371 N.W.2d 781
(1985); Wall 1, 366 N.W.2d 471 (1985); Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d 865 (1985).
13. Rolfstad. 221 N.W.2d 734 (1974); Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
14. White Earth Creamery, 191 N.W. 622 (1922); Stark County, 173 N.W. 817 (1919); Moran,
173 N.W. 769 (1919); Harnening, 141 N.W. 130 (1913); Logan, 103 N.W. 426 (1905); Phelps, 60
NA. 402 (1894); Yer* s, 49 N.W. 422 (1891).
15. See White Earth Creamery, 191 N.W. 622 (1922) (finding that an adverse financial interest
was acquired by the attorney); Stark County, 173 N.W. 817 (1919) (declaring improper an attorney's
withdrawal from representation in order to acquire an adverse financial interest); Moran, 173 N.W.
769 (1919) (finding that an attorney acquired an adverse financial interest in an estate matter);
Harnening, 141 N.W. 130 (1913) (involving a suit against an attorney for fraud, deceit, and exemplary
damages related to a homestead claim); Logan, 103 N.W. 426 (1905) (involving a suit against an
attorney for conversion after he used a client's money for a purpose not designated by the client);
Phelps, 60 N.W. 402 (1894) (involving a suit against an attorney for fraud after he took a portion of a
settlement without disclosing the true amount of the settlement); Yerkes, 49 N.W. 422 (1891) (voiding
a transaction in which an attorney acquired an interest in the client's property, although there was no
intention to defraud). These first seven cases are not "true" legal malpractice cases, but they contain
some of the elements of modem legal malpractice cases. See supra note 1 (defining legal
malpractice).
16. 193 N.W.2d at 219 (1971) (alleging failure to properly file, or advise a client to file, a security
agreement).
17. Kinsey, 446 N.W.2d at 557; Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 564; Olson, 421 N.W.2d at 825;
Haugland, 303 N.W.2d at 537; Rolfstad, 221 N.W.2d at 736.
18. Finch, 491 N.W.2d at 705; Letnes, 311 N.W.2d at 177.
19. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 564; Wall II, 393 N.W.2d at 760; Binstock, 374 N.W.2d at 82; Shark,
373 NAV.2d at 862; Bohn, 371 N.W.2d at 783; Wall 1, 366 N.W.2d at 472; Martinson Bros., 359
N.W.2d at 868.
20. Nodland, 501 N.W.2d at 761; Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d at 740; Herzog, 399 N.W.2d at 289.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in bankruptcy representation;' negligence in probate representation;- 3
failure to file a timely appeal;' negligence in family law matters,2 and
negligence in the supervision of young associate attorneys.25
The upward trend in the number of recently reported opinions sug-
gests that North Dakota attorneys will increasingly be exposed to the pos-
sibility of being sued by a client. The reported cases suggest that at the
turn of the century, attorneys were only sued if they engaged in breaches
of fiduciary duty. The cases since 1971, however, suggest that attorneys
are now being sued for a wide range of errors in a broader range of sub-
ject matter. The next section of this article discusses the elements a plain-
tiff must allege and prove to successfully sue an attorney.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASE
A client must allege and prove four essential elements to support a
legal malpractice claim: (1) the existence of an attorney/client relation-
ship; (2) a duty owed by the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that
duty by the attorney; and (4) damages to the client proximately caused by
the breach of duty.27 Each of these four elements is discussed below.
A. THE PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN
ATfORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
It is well established that, generally, an attorney/client relationship
must have existed before a legal malpractice claim can be maintained
against an attorney.28 Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has
stated that an attorney/client relationship is a necessary predicate to suc-
cessful pursuit of a malpractice case,2 9 no reported cases in North Dakota
identify the criteria necessary to meet this essential element of a legal
malpractice case.30
21. Knoshaug v. Polltman, 245 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir. 1957); Nodland, 501 N.W.2d at 759-760;
Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d at 557; Goetz, 455 N.W.2d at 582; Olson, 421 N.W.2d at 825.
22. Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 656.
23. Berglund, 448 N.W.2d at 628.
24. Mack, 519 N.W.2d at 304; Goetz, 455 N.W.2d at 581.
25. Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
26. Mack, 519 N.W.2d at 304.
27. Wastvedt v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561, 564-65 ( N.D. 1988). These elements were reaffirmed
most recently in Richmond v. Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 749, 761 (1993) (involving allegations against an
attorney of fraud, deceit, and legal malpractice due to the attorney's retention of a $10,000 retainer
fee after obtaining dismissal of criminal charges against the client after a minimum amount of effort
and time).
28. 1 MALaEN & Smrrii, supra note 1, § 7.1 at 360; § 8.1 at 401.
29. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 564.
30. The North Dakota Supreme Court has held, however, that payment of a fee is not necessary
to establish an attorney/client relationship for purposes of confidentiality. Shong v. Farmers' &
Merchants' State Bank, Inc., 70 N.V.2d 907, 922 (N.D. 1955) (not a legal malpractice case).
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If confronted with the issue, however, the supreme court could look
to a number of sources, including the Rules of Evidence and case law
from other jurisdictions, in determining whether an attorney/client rela-
tionship existed. The North Dakota Rules of Evidence, for example,
define a client as follows: "A client is a person, public officer, or corpora-
tion, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private,
who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him."3'
The Supreme Court of North Dakota could also look to other juris-
dictions for guidance in analyzing the existence of an attorney/client rela-
tionship. While an analysis of the case law from other jurisdictions
regarding attorney/client relationships is beyond the scope of this article,
courts have recognized two possible theories of the attorney/client rela-
tionship in legal malpractice cases, as explained in a Minnesota case:
[We] have recognized both a 'contract theory' and a 'tort theory'
of the attorney-client relationship. An attorney-client relation-
ship exists under the 'contract theory' if the parties explicitly or
implicitly agree that the attorney will provide legal services to
the client.... An attorney-client relationship exists under the
'tort theory' even in the absence of an express contract 'when-
ever a person seeks and receives legal advice from a lawyer
under circumstances in which a reasonable person would rely
on the advice.' . . . '[I]t must... be shown that [the attorney]
rendered legal advice (not necessarily at someone's request)
under circumstances which made it reasonably foreseeable to
the attorney that if such advice was rendered negligently, the
individual receiving the advice might be injured thereby.'13
Attorneys can also be liable to nonclients for malpractice. This is
most common in estate legal malpractice cases.m Two principle
approaches are used to determine whether an attorney is liable to a non-
client for legal malpractice: a multi-criteria balancing test and a third
party beneficiary contract theory.34
31. N.D. R. EVID. 502(a)(1).
32. Schuler v. Meschke, 435 N.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Viet v.
Anderson, 428 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). The SchuLer case involved a North
Dakota attorney representing a business composed of North Dakota and Minnesota farmers. I& at
158. Individual farmers sued Mr. Meschke for legal malpractice, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals
found that he represented the cooperative rather than the individual farmers; thus, no attorney/client
relationship existed. Id at 162.
33. The first case in the United States in which legal malpractice liability was extended to third
party nonclients was Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962)
(stating that heirs of an estate can sue an attorney for malpractice in drafting a will even though they
were not in privity with the attorney when the will was drafted).
34. 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 7.11 at 382. North Dakota has not decided whether It
will apply either of the tests, but, according to Mallen and Smith, the balancing test has been
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B. THE PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE
OWED BY THE ATTORNEY TO THE CLIENT
Created concurrently with an attorney/client relationship is a confi-
dential, fiduciary relationship between the attorney and client.- This
confidential, fiduciary relationship is the fundamental principle underly-
ing all duties owed by an attorney to a client.36 Failure to exercise the
duties created by that relationship can result not only in financial liability
to the client for damages in a legal malpractice action, but also in profes-
sional sanctions.
The North Dakota Supreme Court first articulated the broad princi-
ples of an attorney's duty toward a client in Feil v. Wishek.z7 The Wishek
court explained that while an attorney "is not a guarantor of the soundness
of his opinions, or the successful outcome of... litigation," an attorney is
obliged "to use the reasonable knowledge and skill in the transaction of
business which lawyers of ordinary ability and skill possess and
"38exercise.
"accepted with near unanimity by those jurisdictions which have examined the issue." Id. at 383 n.5
(citations omitted).
The California balancing test was developed in Lucas. 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962). The six criteria of the California balancing test are the following:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff;
(2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury;
(5) the policy of preventing future harm; and
(6) whether recognition of liability under the circumstances would impose an undue
burden on the profession.
I MALLEN & SmrrH. supra note 1, § 7.11 at 382.
The third party beneficiary test is based on the concept of third party beneficiary in contract
cases. Under this test, the principle inquiry is whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the
attomrey/ch'ent relationship with the principal or just an incidental beneficiary. 1 MALLEN & SMrrH,
supra note 1, § 7.11 at 389, 390 n.36-44 (citing jurisdictions and cases).
35. Moran v. Simpson, 173 N.W. 769, 774 (N.D. 1919).
36. 1 MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 1, § 11.1 at 633.
37. 193 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1971) (involving an attorney sued for failure to properly advise clients
regarding the filing of a security agreement for the sale of a grocery store).
38. Fell v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 224 (N.D. 1971) (citing McCullough v. Sullivan, 132 A.
102, 103 (1926)). This standard has been applied in recent cases. E.g., Swanson v. Sheppard, 445
N.W.2d 654, 657 (N.D. 1989). The lVishek case is significant in another respect because it applied
medical malpractice principles in a legal malpractice case. The Wishek court stated that 'It]he duties
and liability-between an attorney and his client are the same as those between a physician and his
patient." Wtshek, 193 N.W.2d at 224-25. Since there are more reported medical malpractice cases
than legal malpractice cases in North Dakota, the supreme court often turns to medical malpractice
ases for guidance if there is no controlling case law available in a legal malpractice case. For
example, the court recently adopted the continuous representation rule as a toll to the statute of
limitations by applying the continuing treatment principles of medical malpractice cases to legal
malpractice cases. Wall II, 393 N.W.2d 758, 762-64 (N.D. 1986).
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1. A Statewide Standard of Care Is the Rule in North
Dakota
The Wishek court spoke of both a "statewide" standard39 and a "simi-
lar community" standard for evaluating an attorney's conduct. 40 The simi-
lar community standard is also known as the "locality rule."41 The Wishek
court, however, clearly articulated that Mr. Wishek was governed by a
statewide standard when it held: "Mr. Wishek... failed to exercise that
degree of care commonly possessed and exercised by other reasonable,
careful and prudent lawyers of this state[.J"42 This standard continues to
be applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court.43
2. Expert Opinion Is Generally Required to Establish the
Standard of Care
Generally, the client must submit the opinion of an expert to estab-
lish the standard of care of the attorney being sued for malpractice.4
Surprisingly, it was not until 1988 that the North Dakota Supreme Court
specifically held that expert opinion was an essential element of most legal
malpractice cases.43 Expert opinion is necessary to acquaint a jury with
the standard of care because "a jury cannot rationally apply negligence
principles to professional conduct without evidence of what a reasonable
attorney would have done under the circumstances and the jury may not
be permitted to speculate about what the professional custom may be."46
39. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d at 224 (citing Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 438 P.2nd 865, 866
(1968)).
40. See id. (citing R.sTATEmErrr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229A (1965)).
41. For a detailed discussion of the locality rule," see Fagerlund, supra note 5, at 707-11.
While accurate when written, the existence of a statewide standard, rather than a local standard, is
now unequivocal. See infra note 43.
42. lWshek, 193 N.W.2d at 225 (emphasis added).
43. The most recent case to articulate the statewide standard of care was Bye v. Mack, 519
N.W.2d 302, 305 (N.D. 1994). See also Richmond v. Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 759, 761 (N.D. 1993);
Klein v. Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d 738, 743 (N.D. 1990); Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 657
(N.D. 1989); Wastvedt v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561, 565 (N.D. 1988). A slightly different standard was
articulated by the court in Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D.
1981) (describing the standard of care with reference to "similar communities"). The standard of care
language used in Letnes has not been articulated since that time.
44. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 565. Although no legal malpractice case is precisely on point in North
Dakota, the duty of care can probably be established with the testimony of the defendant attorney.
See Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507,508 (N.D. 1968) (medical malpractice case) (holding that a
defendant physician can be made to testify regarding the standard of care).
45. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 565. In Vaaler, the supreme court cited Letnes as a legal malpractice
case supporting the requirement of expert opinion. Id. at 565-66. Actually, in Letnes the language
used in the footnote discussing expert opinion was permissive, not mandatory: "We note that expert
testimony is permissible to establish the degree of skill and care required whenever the matters to be
proved are not within the knowledge of laymen." See Letnes, 311 N.W.2d at 181 n.4 (emphasis
added). This language appears to be dicta rather than holding because the need for expert opinion
was not an issue in the case. Nonetheless, Letnes is commonly cited by the North Dakota Supreme
Court as holding that expert opinion is generally necessary in legal malpractice cases.
46. Vaaler, 430 N.Wv.2d at 566 (citations omitted).
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An exception to this requirement exists if an attorneys malpractice is
"so egregious and obvious" that a layperson can identify it as such without
expert testimony.4 7 The North Dakota Supreme Court recently applied
this exception in Swanson v. Sheppard.48 The plaintiff had alleged that
the defendant attorney failed to advise him that student loan obligations
were treated differently under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy fil-
ings and that the attorney should have filed under Chapter 13 instead of
Chapter 7.49 The Swanson court held that expert testimony was not nec-
essary to establish the standard of care because the attorney's "miscon-
duct is so obvious that the trier of fact can adequately evaluate the
professional's conduct and comprehend the breach of duty without the
assistance of expert testimony." ° The court determined that the attorney
had a duty to correctly advise his client about basic principles of bank-
ruptcy law."1 This decision indicates that attorneys have a duty, as a mat-
ter of law, to advise clients about basic legal principles related to the
attorney's representation of the client. Although the existence of the duty
itself can be established without expert opinion, expert opinion will prob-
ably be required to establish the particular principles that must be
explained.
3. Duties That Exist as a Matter of Law
Besides the duty to advise a client of basic legal principles, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has identified other duties that an attorney has to
a client as a matter of law. These include:
1. A duty not to acquire a beneficial interest in, or title to, the
subject matter of the litigation.5 2
2. A duty not to acquire an adverse interest in a client's
property.5 3
3. A duty of full disclosure of all facts to a client when settling
a client's case.5
47. Id at 565. An interesting side issue is whether expert opinion is required if a legal
malpractice case is tried to a judge instead of a jury. See generally, 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1,
§ 27.15 at 674-75. While North Dakota does not have case law specifically on this issue, Swanson
seems to suggest that a judge can rule as a matter of law, without aid of expert opinion, that an
attorney had a particular duty and breached that duty if the matter is well settled in the law or
obvious. See Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 657. Note, however, that expert opinion was offered in that
case. lI at 658.
48. 445 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1989).
49. Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 656 (N.D. 1989).
50. Id at 657 (citing Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 565).
51. Id.
52. Yerkes v. Crum, 49 N.W. 422, 423 (N.D. 1891).
53. White Earth Creamery Co. v. Edwardson, 191 N.W. 622, 623 (N.D. 1922).
54. Riegi v. Phelps, 60 N.W. 402, 403 (N.D. 1894).
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4. A duty to exercise the best judgment in determining the
merits of a claim before starting an action.'
5. A duty to fully and fairly explain the meaning of the terms
of contracts.56
6. A duty of undivided loyalty to clients.57
7. A duty to conduct at least minimal legal research.-"
8. A duty to follow the client's legal instructions with reason-
able promptness, even if the attorney honestly believes
that the instructions are not in the best interests of the
client.59
9. A duty to advise of potential conflicts of interest and with-
draw from, or refuse to undertake, legal representation. 60
10. A duty to disclose the significance of documents signed in
a legal transaction, including the various clauses and
61provisions.
11. A duty not to abandon a client without reasonable cause.62
12. A duty to initiate a lawsuit within the statute oflimitations.63
13. A duty to exercise the highest good faith in the interest of
the cient.64
4. The Duty of the Specialist
Some jurisdictions hold an attorney who specializes in a particular
area of law to a higher standard of care than a generalist attorney. 5 The
North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet adopted such a standard. Most
jurisdictions that have considered the issue hold the specialist to a higher
55. Stark County v. Mischel, 173 N.W. 817, 819 (N.D. 1919).
56. Moran v. Simpson, 173 N.W. 769, 773 (N.D. 1919).
57. See Rolfstad, Winkjer, Suess, McKennett & Kaiser v. Hanson, 221 N.W.2d 734, 737 (N.D.
1974) (holding that an attorney can be liable to his client for losses resulting from representing
adverse interests).
58. Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 874 (N.D. 1985) (suggesting the proposition
and citing Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975) in support).
59. Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 829-830 (N.D. 1988) (stating that "an attorney's honest
belief that the instructions were not in the best interests of the client is not a defense to a suit for
malpractice").
60. Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank of Lankin, 421 N.W.2d 45, 53 (N.D. 1988) (not a legal
malpractice case, however); see also, Rolfstad, 221 N.W.2d at 737.
61. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 566.
62. Stark County, 173 N.W. at 820 ("Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that
an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, and
he is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. .
63. Letnes, 311 N.W.2d at 181 (finding this to be true when the statute of limitations is well
settled).
64. Stark County, 175 N.W. at 820; White Earth Creamery, 191 N.W. at 623.
65. See I MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 15.4 at 863-67. See also Fagerlund, supra note 5,
at 690-97 (discussing the "specialist" standard of care).
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standard of care because of the attorney's more advanced knowledge of
the subject matter.'
A related issue is whether an attorney engaged in the general prac-
tice of law should be held to the standard of care of a specialist if the
generalist attorney represents a client in a specialized area of law, such as
a medical malpractice case. Although North Dakota does not have case
law on the subject, this rule applies to physicians in medical malpractice
cases when a general practitioner undertakes care normally practiced by a
medical specialist.67 It seems logical to hold the attorney to the higher
standard of care, especially in areas where a higher degree of expertise is
required and where the attorney undertakes representation knowing that
the matter is beyond the attorneys knowledge and expertise.'
C. THE PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH A BREACH OF THE
STANDARD OF CARE OWED BY THE ATTORNEY TO THE
CLIENT
Once an attorney/client relationship and the duty of care are estab-
lished, the client also must establish a breach of that duty. Whether the
attorney's conduct met the appropriate standard of care is generally a
question for the trier of fact.69
1. Expert Opinion Is Generally Necessary to Establish
Breach of the Standard of Care
The same rules regarding the necessity of expert opinion to establish
the standard of care also govern whether the attorney's conduct deviated
from the standard of care.70 In other words, expert opinion is usually
required unless the conduct "is so egregious or obvious that a layperson
can comprehend the professional's breach of duty without the existence
of expert testimony."'
66. 1 MALLEN & SMmI, supra note 1, § 15.4 at 863-67.
67. See, e.g., Larson v. Yelle, 246 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. 1976) (holding a general practitioner
to the standard of an obstetrician because the general practitioner failed to refer the patient to an
obstetrician or consult with the specialist).
68. 1 MAT.N & SMrrH, supra note 1. § 15.4 at 871.
69. Bye v. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302, 305 (N.D. 1994) (citing Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359
N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1985) and 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 27.7). Generally, findings
of fact will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. "[A] finding of fact is
clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court, upon review of the entire evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id
70. Wastvedt v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561, 565 (N.D. 1988).
71. Id See supra part III.B.2 (discussing the need to offer expert testimony to establish the
standard of care). A good example of the need for expert testimony to rove a reach of duty isCoided by Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., in which it was alleged that the Letnes law
was negligent in failing to initiate a wrongful death action within the two-year statute of
limitations. 311 N.W.2d 175, 177 (N.D. 1981). The trial court had granted the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, finding the defendant negligent as a matter of law. Id at 180. The supreme
court reversed, stating that the applicable statute of limitations in a wrongful death case had not been
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2. Use of Disciplinary Proceedings to Prove Breach of the
Standard of Care
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not addressed the possibility
of using collateral estoppel to apply prior disciplinary proceedings against
an attorney to prove a breach of the duty of care owed to a client. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has ruled that under North
Dakota state law, a client cannot use collateral estoppel in this manner
because of a lack of privity in the disciplinary proceeding. 72
3. The North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Breach of Standards of Care
Clients also have attempted to use violations of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, or the Rules of Professional Conduct, to establish an
attorneys duty and to prove that an attorney breached that duty.73 How-
ever, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that although breaches
of ethical rules can be relevant and admissible in legal malpractice cases,
violations of these rules "constitute only rebuttable evidence of legal mal-
practice."' For a violation of the Rules of Professional Responsibility to
be admissible in a legal malpractice case, damages must have arisen from
the conduct alleged to be a violation of the ethics rules.7'
4. Use of the Judgment and Evidence From the Case
Underlying the Legal Malpractice Case
In a legal malpractice case, a client may attempt to introduce evi-
dence and the judgment from the case out of which the legal malpractice
arose. This may not be permissible if the defendant attorney was not a
party in the previous case, because "the judgment and evidence intro-
duced in the previous action [would] have no evidentiary value against
him."76 In some cases, however, it may be appropriate to admit docu-
mentation from the previous case, even if the defendant attorney was not
a party.7' Moreover, if the conduct of the defendant attorney in the for-
mer action is at issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court has indicated
decided in North Dakota and that expert opinion was allowable on the issue. I&L at 181. The court
pointed out, however, that an attorney could be negligent in overlooking a statute of limitations if it
was well established. Id-
72. Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). The
Kuehn court indicated that it thought North Dakota's collateral estoppel law was flawed; however, it
recognized that in a diversity case it was bound to apply the substantive law of North Dakota. ML at
1147
73. See Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d at 875 ; Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 827 (N.D.
1988); Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 86 (N.D. 1985).
74. Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d at 875.
75. Binstock, 374 N.W.2d at 86.
76. Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 785 (N.D. 1985).
77. Id. at 786.
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that the documentation shall be admissible: "[T]he judgment, evidence,
and transcripts in the former action may [be] not only the best, but per-
haps the only, evidence upon which to make a determination of whether
or not the attorney was negligent in handling the former litigation."78
Whether or not findings from a previous case are admitted, a plaintiff
may not be wise in relying upon them to establish an attorney's negli-
gence. In one North Dakota case, a plaintiff attempted to rely upon a
court's interpretation of a contract which the defendant attorney had
drafted to show the attorney's negligence in drafting the contract in a
subsequent legal malpractice case. 9 The North Dakota Supreme Court
stated: "A successfully asserted claim for legal malpractice requires more
than the fact, standing alone, that a trial or appellate court interpreted a
document differently than the lawyer or his client assumed they would."80
The court has also stated that an attorney's possible breach of a standard
of care at issue in a malpractice case cannot be resolved by the opinion of
the supreme court in the underlying case when the attorneys conduct was
not at issue in the underlying case.81
D. THE PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH THAT THE ATTORNEY'S
BREACH OF CARE CAUSED INJURY TO THE CLIENT
Once the client has established the existence of an attorney/client
relationship, the attorney's duty, and breach of that duty, the client has
the burden of proving that damages proximately resulted from the breach
of that duty.82 In other words, the client must prove that had the attorney
not acted in the manner alleged, a more favorable result to the client
would have occurred.-
In deciding the issue of proximate cause, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has in some cases applied the "case-within-a-case" doctrine." This
78. Id. at 787.
79. Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d at 873. The defendant attorney in that case had drafted a
purchase contract for the plaintiffs. Id. at 869. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in a case involving
the subject matter of the contract, had stated that" 'the contract is, at best, confusing or ambiguous as
to what was actually purchased by (the plaintifi].'" Id (quoting Oakes Farming Ass'n v. Martinson
Bros., 318 N.W.2d 897, 908 (N.D. 1982)).
80. Id. The court was influenced by its holding in Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1971),
stating: "a lawyer, without an express ageement, .is not a guarantor. .. that the instruments he will
draft will be held valid by the court of-last resort."' Id (quoting Wishek, 193 N.W.2d at 224).
81. Klein v. Greenwood, 450 N.W.2d 738, 744 (N.D. 1990.
82. Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d at 872, 875. See also Wastvedt v. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d 561,
564-65 (N.D. 1988). In Vaaler, shareholders in a bank brought a legal malpractice action against Mr.
Vaaler alleging, among other things, a conflict of interest in the sale of bank stock. at 561
Although te jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the
district court in granting Mr. Vaaler's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that
the plaintiffs had not shown that a nonnegligent attorney would have obtained a better result. Id. at
568.
83. Bye v. Mack, 519 N.W.2d 302,305 (N.D. 1994); Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654,658
(N.D. 1989).
84. E.g., Mack, 519 N.W.2d at 305; Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 567.
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doctrine is normally applied in cases involving negligently conducted liti-
gation, but the court has also found it to be applicable in conflict of inter-
est cases.85 In the traditional "case-within-a-case" approach in negligent
litigation cases, the client must essentially put on a trial within a trial. 8 A
good example of this is an attorney's failure to sue an automobile accident
case within the statute of limitations. Under the "case-within-a-case" doc-
trine, the plaintiff must try the automobile negligence case to the jury or
court to prove that had the case been timely initiated, the plaintiff would
have prevailed. The legal malpractice case is then tried. 7
The "case-within-a-case" approach, however, can create a very diffi-
cult burden for a client to meet. For instance, if an attorney does not
investigate or preserve evidence in an automobile injury case and then
fails to bring the case within the six-year statute of limitations, it is very
likely that the evidence necessary to prove the underlying personal injury
case will be destroyed, lost, or altered. In essence, the attorney's lack of
due diligence could make the "case-within-a-case" virtually impossible to
prove, creating a "Catch 22." In such a case, an attorney might ask a court
to make an exception to the "case-within-a-case" doctrine. While the
"case-within-a-case" approach is considered the majority rule,88 some
jurisdictions allow the client to establish proximate cause through the use
of expert testimony regarding the likelihood of success and the value of
the claim lost. 9 The North Dakota Supreme Court has not considered
this issue.
E. THE PLAINTIFF MUST EsTABLisH DAMAGES
Proof of damages is an essential element of a legal malpractice case,
even if a breach of accepted standards of care has been established. 90 If
the client fails to establish an actual loss proximately caused by the attor-
ney's breach of duty, not even nominal damages can be awarded because
liability has not been established.9
Although the supreme court has not identified damages as a separate
element of a legal malpractice case, many of its decisions discuss damages
issues in detail. This subsection contains a discussion of those damages
issues, including: the general measure of damages; economic and
85. Vaaler, 430 N.W.2d at 567.
86. 1 MALLEN & SMrrH. supra note 1, § 27.1 at 624-625.
87. Id. at 624.
88. I& § 27.7 at 642.
89. I& 27.14 at 664.
90. Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 827 (N.D. 1988).
91. Id. The requirement of proof of damages has an interesting application in situations in
which a default judgment has been obtained by a client against a defendant attorney. Thompson v.
Goetz, 455 N.W.2d 580, 585 (N.D. 1990). If damages are not established in the default hearing, the
legal malpractice claim must fail because an essential element of the claim has not been proved. Id.
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noneconomic damages, including emotional distress damages; attorneys'
fees; mitigation of damages; exemplary damages; statutory treble dam-
ages; and joint and several liability of law partners.
1. The Measure of Damages, Generally
Damages in a legal malpractice case are generally governed by the
same statutory provisions as damages for any other tort action.2 The
North Dakota Century Code provides that the measure of damages for a
tort "is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi-
mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not."93
2. Economic and Noneconomic Damages in Legal
Malpractice Cases
In 1987, the North Dakota Legislature codified the types of damages
that are recoverable in North Dakota.9 4 Essentially, the legislation
divided damages into two categories: economic and noneconomic dam-
ages. Economic damages include "medical expenses and medical care,
rehabilitation services, custodial care, loss of earnings and earning capac-
ity, loss of income or support, burial costs, cost of substitute domestic
services, loss of employment or business or employment opportunities
and other monetary losses."95 Noneconomic damages include "pain, suf-
fering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental
anguish, emotional distress, fear of injury, loss or illness, loss of society
and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation,
and other nonpecuniary damage.9"
The supreme court has not yet applied these provisions to a legal
malpractice case. It would appear that these provisions should apply to
legal malpractice cases, however, because the statute states that it is to be
applied in "any civil action for damages for... injury to a person whether
arising out of breach of contract or tort .... ",e A legal malpractice case is
an action in tort. Moreover, the statute has already been used in medical
malpractice cases,9 8 and the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied
medical malpractice principles in legal malpractice- cases.9
92. Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781,789 (N.D. 1985) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03-01,
-20).
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-20 (1976).
94. 1987 N.D. Laws ch. 404, § 4. The statute had a sunset clause which was repealed in 1993.
See 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 339, § 1.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04(1) (Supp. 1993).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04(2) (Supp. 1993).
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (Supp. 1993).
98. See Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.V.d 85, 87 (N.D. 1988).
99. See supra note 38 (discussing medical malpractice principles applied in legal malpractice
cases in North Dakota).
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On the other hand, the majority of jurisdictions hold that pain and
suffering and emotional distress damages generally are not recoverable in
legal malpractice cases.lco If the North Dakota Supreme Court were to
allow damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress under the
broad provisions of this statute, it would deviate from the majority rule.
Yet, the supreme court has taken a more expansive view of damages since
section 32-03.2-04 became effective in 1987.101 Case law in North
Dakota suggests that a claim for noneconomic damages may be pursued if
a legal malpractice case involves palpable emotional distress caused by an
attorney's breach of duty.102
3. Attorneys' Fees in Legal Malpractice Cases
Attorneys' fees generally are not recoverable in legal malpractice
cases, 103 unless the attorneys negligence forced the client into litigation
with another party.' 4
The general rule against recovery of attorneys' fees in legal malprac-
tice cases may result in an insufficient recovery for some plaintiffs. For
example, if an attorneys negligence caused a client to have a judgment of
$200,000.00 entered against him, the client's basic damages would be the
judgment and any interest accrued on the judgment. This is the mini-
mum recovery necessary to satisfy the judgment. If a jury awards only
this amount, the entire award will be used to satisfy the judgment. The
100. 1 MALLEN & SmrrH, supra note 1, § 16.11 at 903-905. Emotional distress damages,
however, can be recovered in the legal malpractice case as an element of damages in the underlying
case. For example, if the attorney is negligent in missing a statute of limitations in an automobile
crash case, the emotional distress damages the client incurred as a result of the crash are recoverable
damages in the malpractice case against the attorney. Under the majority rule, however, additional
emotional distress damages incurred by the client as a result of the attorney's malpractice would not
be recoverable.
101. See e.g., Hopkins, 427 N.W.2d at 95 (holding that a parent may recover damages in a
wrongful death action for the loss of society and companionship of a child and for mental anguish
related to the child's death in a medical malpractice case); First Trust Company of North Dakota v.
Scheel's Hardware, 429 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (N.D. 1988) (holding that a parent can recover damages for
loss of society and companionship of a child in a personal i'ury action); Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co.,
430 N.W.2d 558,559-60 (N.D. 1988) (discussing emotional distress damages, but refusing to overrule
the "zone of danger" test enunciated in Wheham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D.
1972)).
102. This issue was raised, but not answered, in Finch v. Backes, 491 N.W.2d 705, 707 (N.D.
1992). In cases of severe emotional distress, a client's attorney suing a legal malpractice case should
not overlook the possibility of the tort of outrage. Muchow v. Linblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D.
1989) and Hanke v. Global Van Lines, 533 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976) are cases In which the tort of
outrage was applied; however, they are not legal malpractice cases. See also Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466
N.W.2d 553, 559 (N.D. 1991) (recognizing that an attorney can be liable for other torts besides
negligence, such as fraud). Outrageous conduct by an attorney should support a claim for the tort of
outrage, just as deceit by an attorney will support a claim for fraud.
103. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d at 829. This is the majority rule. I MALLEN & SMrr, supra note 1,
§ 16.14 at 908.
104. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d at 829 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 698 P.2d 5, 12
(Ct. App. 1985)); Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages Recoverable for Attorney's
Negligence with Respect to Maintenance or Prosecution of Litigation on Appeal, 45 A.L.R.2D 62, 84
(1956)); see also, 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 16.6 at 899-900.
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client must still pay attorneys' fees for the malpractice case. Thus, the
client is not made whole.
Some jurisdictions hold that a legal malpractice damage award must
be reduced by any attorneys' fees the client would have had to pay in the
underlying action had the malpractice not occurred. l s Other jurisdic-
tions, including Minnesota, take the view that legal malpractice awards
are not reduced by the attorneys' fees the client would have had to pay in
the underlying action. 106 The latter approach is more likely to fully com-
pensate the client. This is particularly true in legal malpractice cases aris-
ing out of personal injury claims. Personal injury claims are often
accepted by attorneys on a contingency fee basis. Legal malpractice
claims arising out of personal injury claims are also often accepted on a
contingency fee basis. If the legal malpractice jury award is reduced by
the contingent fee agreed to in the underlying case and the legal malprac-
tice plaintiff's attorney takes a contingency fee on the remainder, the cli-
ent is not fully and fairly compensated for the injuries suffered. Under
the Minnesota approach, the client ultimately receives greater
compensation.
4. Mitigation of Damages
Plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases have a duty to reasonably mini-
mize or mitigate damages.10 7 This means that an attorney representing a
client may have to take legal action to limit a client's damages.
One mitigation issue that often surfaces in legal malpractice cases is
whether Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure can be
used to reopen a previous judgment to undo a prior attorney's negligent
conduct. While use of Rule 60(b) should be considered as a potential
mitigation tool, the case law is clear that the legal malpractice of an attor-
ney is generally not sufficient grounds to reopen a judgment; there must
be other Rule 60(b) grounds to reopen the judgment.108 North Dakota
has not yet discussed Rule 60(b) as it relates to mitigation in legal mal-
practice cases.
105. 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 16.18 at 911-914 (discussing both sides of the issue).
106. See Christy v. Saliterman, 179 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1970); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller &
Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
107. Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 658 (N.D. 1989). The Swanson court stated: -If
an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with an alternative remedy or
remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result may be that the client suffers no loss or a
reduced loss as the proximate cause of the attorney's negligent conduct." Id Of course, the
interesting corollary to this rule is the possibility that a client may have a case against the malpractice
attorney for failing to recommend mitigation of damages or for failing to actually mitigate the
damages.
108. 11 WRIcsrr AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CML § 2858 (1982).
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While clients must reasonably mitigate damages, they are not
required to proceed with unreasonable, impractical, disproportionately
expensive, or futile efforts to mitigate damages.109
In general, attorneys' fees and costs related to the mitigation of dam-
ages are recoverable in a legal malpractice case." 0 However, the mitiga-
tion of damages requirement may still be cost prohibitive to a client of
limited financial means.
5. Exemplary Damages
Exemplary damages are recoverable in legal malpractice cases."' To
support a claim for exemplary damages, the client must establish that the
attorney engaged in oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed."
2
In addition, the client must establish that the acts of oppression, fraud, or
malice resulted in damage to the client." 3
6. Treble Damages Pursuant to North Dakota Century Code
Section 27-13-08
Section 27-13-08 of the North Dakota Century Code is an exception-
ally useful damages tool for malpractice clients. This statute allows clients
to collect treble damages if an attorney has engaged in certain types of
deceitful or collusive misconduct." 4 In construing this statute, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has held that while no criminal conviction of the
defendant attorney is required for treble damages, only those damages
resulting from fraud or collusion may be trebled."- The court has also
held that a client cannot obtain both treble damages and punitive dam-
ages for the same acts because this would amount to a double recovery or
an excessive penalty.16 The client should still be able to present both the
109. Id.; 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, § 16.21 at 917.
110. 1 MAtaN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 16.10 at 902-903.
111. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 1993) (restricting pleading of exemplary
damages so that they cannot be pleaded until leave is obtained from the court). The first North
Dakota legal malpractice case to discuss exemplary damages was Harmening v. Howland, 141 N.W.2d
131 (N.D. 1913). See also Kinsey. 466 N.W.2d at 553.
112. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d at 828.
113. Id.
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-13-08 (1991) (providing that an attorney who deceives a client,
delays a client's suit for personal gain, or improperly receives money is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and liable for treble damages in a civil action).
115. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d at 559. Since only those damages caused by the fraud or collusion can
be trebled, attorneys representing the attorney defendant should request a special verdict separating
out the damages so as to avoid having the entire verdict trebled. This is what happened in Kinsey. Id.
at 559. Mr. Kinsey tried to raise this issue on appeal, but was prohibited from doing so because the
record on appeal did not reveal that he had requested separation before submission of the case to the
jury. Id.
116. Id. at 561-62. It would appear proper, however, for a client to obtain both punitive and
treble damages in the same case if different acts of deceit or collusion exist. This may allow the client
to recover exemplary damages on an act of deceit, while recovering treble damages on the damages
directly resulting from a separate act of collusion or even a separate act of deceit
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treble damages and punitive damages to the jury and elect judgment on
the greater verdict." 7
7. Joint and Several Liability of Law Partners
Financial liability for legal malpractice can be extended vicariously to
the partners of the negligent attorney by the joint and several liability
rules of partnership law.'"" In order for joint and several liability to exist,
the wrong must have occurred on behalf of the law firm and must have
been within the scope of the business of the law firm." 9
IV. COMMON DEFENSES TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
In addition to the defenses that the essential elements of a legal mal-
practice case have not been established, or that a plaintiff has failed to
mitigate damages, there are two other common defenses used in legal
malpractice cases: contributory negligence of the client and expiration of
the statute of limitations. Other defenses have also been attempted.
Each of these is discussed below.
A. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE CLIENT
While contributory negligence is available as a defense in legal mal-
practice cases, it generally is not a defense in fraud or deceit actions.'"
Under current comparative negligence principles in North Dakota, a cli-
ent's contributory negligence is not necessarily a total bar to recovery, but




B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Generally, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice in North
Dakota is two years from the date of the malpractice.122 Numerous North
117. See Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 515-16 (N.D. 1989) (holding that in a products
liability case, theplaintiff may submit two different theories of recovery to the jury and elect to have
judgment entered on the theory that provides the greatest recovery).
118. Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 832-33 (N.D. 1988).
119. Id at 832. In the Fraase case, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a judgment
entered against a partner in a law firm on the basis of joint and several liability for another partner's
negligent preparation of a mineral interest deed. I& at 832-33.
120. Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d 553, 559 (N.D. 1991).
121. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01, -02 (Supp. 1993).
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1991). See also Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533
(N.D. 1981) (explaining that these statutory provisions apply to both tort and contract causes of
action); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16(6) (1991) (providing a six-year statute of limitations for
claims alleging fraud, deceit, or collusion); Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d at 558 (holding that fraud cases
against attorneys have a six-year statute of limitations and citing Herzog v. Yuill. 399 N.W.2d 287,291
(N.D. 1987)).
[Vol. 70:615
NORTH DAKOTA LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Dakota cases have attempted to clarify the meaning of this general
rule.'23
1. The Discovery Rule
The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that a cause of
action for legal malpractice accrues when "the act of malpractice with
resulting injury is, or by reasonable diligence could be, discovered."124
This is commonly called the discovery rule.
The court has held that three elements are necessary for discovery to
have occurred: "Time starts running when the plaintiff knows, or with
reasonable diligence should have known, (1) of the injury, (2) its cause,
and (3) defendant's possible negligence."'' 2 However, a cause of action
may arise before the client sustains all of the damage flowing from the
attorney's malpractice. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has
explained: "Any appreciable and actual harm flowing from the attorney's
negligent conduct establishes a cause of action upon which the client may
sue."128 Moreover, discovery does not occur when a client "subjectively
believe[s]" that he or she has suffered injury resulting from an attorney's
malpractice.'" 7  Rather, the standard is an objective one, "focus[ing] ...
upon whether the plaintiff has been apprised of facts which would place a
reasonable person on notice that a potential claim exists."12s For example,
discovery occurs when a client is advised by an attorney of his or her
potential malpractice claim.' 29
It should also be noted that the six-year statutory limit to nondis-
covery in medical malpractice cases does not apply to legal malpractice
cases.' 30 Thus, lack of discovery in a legal malpractice case, unlike a med-
ical malpractice case, could toll the statute of limitations for an indefinite
period of time.
123. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d at 536; Phillips Fur and Wool Co. v. Bailey, 340 N.W.2d 448 (N.D.
1983); Wall 1, 366 N.W.2d 471, 472 (N.D. 1985); Wall II, 393 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1986); Herzog,
399 N.W.2d at 290; Berglund v. Gulsvig, 448 N.W.2d 627, 628 (N.D. 1989); Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d at
557; Finch v. Backes, 491 N.W.2d 705, 705 (N.D. 1992).
124. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d at 539 (citing Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1969) (a
medical malpractice case)).
125. Phillips Fur, 340 N.W.2d at 449.
126. Wall , 366 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting PaOSSER, LAW OF ToNTs § 30 at 144 (4th ed. 1971)).
127. Wall II, 393 N.W.2d at 761.
128. Ia (emphasis added).
129. Id at 762.
130. Id. Section 28-01-18(3) of the North Dakota Century Code states:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice; provided, however,
that the limitation of an action against a physician or licensed hospital will not be
extended beyond six years of the act or omission of alleged malpractice by a nondiscovery
thereof unless discovery was prevented by the frauduent conduct of the physician or
licensed hospital. This limitation is subject to the provisions of section 28-01-25.
N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-01-18(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
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2. The Continuous Representation Rule
The North Dakota Supreme Court has applied the continuous repre-
sentation rule in legal malpractice cases. 131 Under this rule, the statute of
limitations is tolled, or deferred, while the attorney continues to represent
the client with respect to the same subject matter as the allegedly negli-
gent acts.132 There are three policies behind the rule: (1) the attorney/
client relationship is one of trust and confidence that can deter the client
from realizing there is a negligence case;' - (2) an attorney knowing of his
or her own negligence might procrastinate while the statute of limitations
runs;' and (3) the attorney should be allowed time to correct the wrong
so that potential malpractice lawsuits may be avoided.'"
Under the continuous representation rule, termination of represen-
tation is the key date for the running of the limitation period.136 The
court has stated that the time at which representation terminates is gener-
ally a question of fact for the jury.137 However, the court has not identi-
fied any clear factors for deciding when representation terminates. The
court has suggested that representation continues if the attorney is ren-
dering legal advice or services.'38
3. Other Tolls to the Statute of Limitations
Besides the continuous representation toll, the statute of limitations
can be tolled by disability, infancy, imprisonment, or an attorney's
absence from the state or fraudulent concealment. 3 9 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has dealt with imprisonment, attorney's absence from the
state, and attorney's fraudulent concealment as tolls to the statute of limi-
tations. The court has stated that a plaintiff must bring a legal malprac-
tice action within one year from his or her release from prison.'40 The
court has also stated that the statute of limitations may be tolled for a
maximum of one year by a defendant attorney's absence from the state by
131. E.g., Wall 11, 393 N.W.2d at 762.
132. Id. See also Rude, supra note 6. at 719.
133. Wall II, 393 N.W.2d at 762 (citing Siegel v. Kranis, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div.
1968)).
134. Id. at 763 (citing Siegel v. Kranis, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)).
135. Id. (citing Note, Civil Procedure-Statute of Limitations Accrued in Attorney Malpractice
Actions: Thorpe u. DeMent, 20 WAKE FoaEs-r L. REv. 1017, 1028-29 (1984)).
136. Id.
137. ld.
138. Wall II. 393 N.W.2d at 764.
139. See N.D. CETrr. CODE § 28-01-25 (1991). See also Herzog, 399 N.W.2d at 290 (discussing
imprisonment as a toll to the statute of limitations); Berglund, 448 N.W.2d at 628 (discussing an
attorney's absence from the state as a toll to the statute of limitations); Binstock v. Tschider, 374
N.W.2d 81, 85 (N.D. 1985) (discussing an attorney's fraudulent concealment as a toll to the statute of
limitations).
140. Herzog, 399 N.W.2d 287, 290 (N.D. 1987).
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operation of section 28-01-32 of the North Dakota Century Code.141
Finally, fraudulent concealment by an attorney can provide a client with
additional time to bring an action against the attorney.142
In one case, a plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should
have been tolled because he could not locate an attorney to represent
him.' 43 The supreme court stated that while difficulty in obtaining an
attorney is unfortunate, "it is not a proper basis for extending the limita-
tion period." 44
4. Equitable Estoppel as a Bar to the Statute of Limitations
Clients have also attempted to argue that an attorney can be barred
from asserting a statute of limitations defense to a legal malpractice claim
by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.' 45 The argument is that if an attor-
ney makes statements to a client that the client relies upon in failing to
bring a legal malpractice case against the attorney in a timely manner, the
attorney is barred by equitable principles from asserting the defense of
untimeliness. The North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet applied this
theory to bar a statute of limitations defense.
C. OTHER DEFENSES
There is at least one reported North Dakota case discussing the use
of a compulsory counterclaim defense in a legal malpractice case. In
Klein v. Greenwood,146 Mr. Greenwood attempted to defeat Mr. Klein's
pro se legal malpractice claim against him by asserting that the legal mal-
practice case was a compulsory counterclaim to an attorney fee collection
action that had previously been filed by the attorney and decided against
Mr. Klein.' 4 Because the North Dakota Supreme Court decided the
case on other grounds, however, the potential success of a compulsory
counterclaim defense remains uncertain.
Although not a true defense to a legal malpractice case, an attorney's
counterclaim of defamation also has been used in response to a client's
legal malpractice claim. 148 In the only case in which it dealt with this
tactic, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court frowned upon it, stat-
ing that if the attorney had filed the counterclaim of defamation in order
141. Berglund, 448 NAV.2d at 628 (involving negligence in the probate of a will).
142. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-01-24 (1991) (providing a one-year statute of limitations for claims
for relief fraudulently concealed); See also Binstock, 374 N.W.2d at 85 (declining to rule upon a
fraudulent concealment claim against an attorney because of lack of evidence).
143. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d at 540.
144. Id. (citing Harvey v. Connor, 407 N.E.2d 879, 881 (I1l. App. 1980)).
145. See Binstock, 374 N.W.2d at 85.
146. 450 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1990).
147. Klem v. Greenwood, 450 N.V.2d 738. 741 (N.D. 1990).
148. Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 655, 659 (N.D. 1989).
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to deter the client from pursuing his malpractice case, this would consti-
tute an improper purpose warranting sanctions. 149
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of reported legal
malpractice cases in North Dakota within the last decade. At the turn of
the century, North Dakota attorneys were sued only if they engaged in
breaches of fiduciary duty. Cases decided more recently, however, sug-
gest that attorneys are not only being sued more often, but they are being
sued for a broader range of errors and subject matter. If this trend con-
tinues, which there is every reason to believe it will, North Dakota attor-
neys will increasingly be exposed to the possibility of being sued for legal
malpractice. As clients become more willing to sue their lawyers, they
will be seeking representation from North Dakota attorneys. While it
may be distasteful to sue a legal colleague, members of the bar must be
willing to represent injured clients. If the legal profession is to maintain
credibility with the public, we must demonstrate a willingness to police
our profession. While a number of North Dakota attorneys have repre-
sented legal malpractice plaintiffs, more attorneys are needed to protect
the rights of those injured by legal malpractice. This article has provided
a basic outline of the law of legal malpractice in North Dakota and will,
hopefully, encourage more attorneys to represent clients who have been
victimized by legal malpractice.
149. I&
636 [Vol. 70:615
